During the panel, the question of market vs team in venture/angel investing came up. Jason was in the “team” camp while Reid was more in “market” camp – but these are very broad generalizations and both emphasized the importance of both in any investment they make. Examples were discussed that give credence to both strategies working and it largely being a personal investing preference. On several occasions, I have heard this debate of market vs team with Sequoia and Kleiner Perkins being used as the poster children for each view point, respectively.

Its a discussion item that I’ve heard on a number of occasions, and I can see the arguments on both sides. While I sometimes hear the scenario being, would you rather invest in a great team in a crappy market or a crappy team in a great market, in general practice, the more realistic scenario for an investor may be, would you rather invest in a A+ team in an A- market or a A- team in a A+ market or a A+ team in an unknown/unclear market or an unproven team in a A+ market. This is where, at least for me personally, I spend more time thinking about.

When the VC funnel is 1 investment out of 100-200 companies/business plans seen, the expectation is that they are choosing from a few companies that have the A+/A- or A+/unknown dynamic – and have already weeded out the B or C teams and markets in the vetting process.

It can be difficult to do a post-mortem on successful or failing companies to try to see a trend because, as the saying goes, success has many fathers (in this case it is both people and market) and failure has none. People often attribute success of a company to the founding/management team (which may or may not be accurate) but the more interesting question is, “before the company was successful and was a startup with 3 guys and powerpoint deck, how did the VCs rate the team.” Also, there are enough examples of what is initially felt to be a great team failing.

I was not personally familiar (so please correct me if I am inaccurate) with some of the larger Southern California successes when they were just being founded but from hearsay, the teams at LowerMyBills and MySpace had trouble raising venture capital very early on yet went on to becoming huge successes and the teams eventually proving themselves to be great founders and operators. While they both raised venture funding later in their lives, it was beyond the very early stage and they had proven themselves on several fronts from an execution perspective.

So, how is this post relevant to entrepreneurs (and not just contributing to the academic exercise of VC discussions)? Here are a couple of points

• All VCs want the A+ team and the A+ market. Be realistic with how you grade yourself. Put yourself in the following scenario. If you inherited $5M from a rich uncle and his only criteria is that you had to use all the money to invest in 1 company. Would you pick your own startup/team? Would you pick another team?
• If you honestly put yourself in the “not A+ team” (hopefully not a C team but maybe a B+ or in the unknown/unproven camp), the VC will make the same assessment – and more likely, will be much harder graders than you (though he/she may never say this as it can obviously be quite offensive and VCs already have a fragile reputation to maintain – check out this post from Healy Jones, a friend who used to be at Atlas Ventures), make sure you pick an exciting/large/growing/hot market. Then figure out how to enhance your team though recruiting another co-founder or bringing in management/advisors/directors who an fill in gaps and raise your team assessment. You can ask the VC directly to gather some insight into this by asking for “what holes they feel the team would need to fill out”
• If you have assembled a strong team and are either still seeking the right market/business or know the current business may not that interesting (you will get this feedback very easily and quickly from the VC because it less offensive), take the opportunity in meetings with VC and others to gather feedback to adjust your plan. While the VC may not have the silver bullet on the exact business you should pursue, we see a lot of companies and trends and can give good insight into how to think about your business from an investor perspective. Hone your plan and use the feedback to make your business stronger.
• If you are passionate about your startup but are very self aware and realize that you fall short on both team and market, take it in stride and use your time to find the best startup to join. Network and surround yourself with people with insight into companies that do fit the criteria. Early employees at Google, Ebay, Yahoo, Microsoft, LowerMyBills, MySpace, Facebook, etc  aren’t doing too badly : ) . And maybe after some successful experiences at other startups, you will elevate your “team” grade to the point of being “fundable”
• Lastly, if you are the A+ team in the A+ market (or at least that is what you are told by several VCs giving you term sheets – congrats…but don’t pat yourself on the back for too long. Plenty of VC funded startups fail for many reasons. Team dynamics/culture, reacting too slowly to changing market conditions, competitors emerging that out-execute, and just plain bad luck. As Reid stated on several occasions, BE PARANOID…and he said when teams he invests in stop being paraoid, that is when he gets really really worried.

Before diving into some thoughts around how best to break into the industry, I will assume you have done your homework on exactly what being a VC entails and you still want in. I think plenty of people are attracted to VC for various reasons – many of which only scratch the surface of what being a VC is really all about. There is an aura around VC that doesn’t really reflect accurately what it can be like on the inside. Rather than trying to dissuade you or confirm whether you really know what you are getting into, I’ll spend most of this entry with just the practicalities of preparing yourself for trying to break into the industry.

Some quick bits of information to start that will set the stage for this topic

• VC is a small industry (and getting smaller). I believe there are on the order of 1000 venture capital firms with less than 10,000 total investment professionals in the entire industry. Just to put this in perspective, Microsoft alone has around 80,000-90,000 employees. Google has 20,000-30,000. Apple has 30,000-40,000.
• Most VCs have educational degrees from very select schools – Harvard, Stanford, Wharton, MIT, Yale, Princeton, Berkeley, etc. Most have advanced degrees – MBA, JD, MD, Ph.D., MS.
• Most VC firms are relatively small in terms of number of investment professions – 5-10 being the most common. Cultural fit is paramount as its often a small team.

So given this, what are my tips and why?

• One question I get quite often from people what want to get into VC, don’t think they have an opportunity immediately, but want to know what job to take that would position them best for VC down the line – should they join a startup or join a larger “brand name” company or go into investment banking or go into consulting. My advice is there is no one perfect career path….but whatever you do, just do it REALLY WELL. To get evidence of this, do your homework. Take a look at the bios of as many VCs as you can on the web (almost everyone has a bio on their website or LinkedIn) and see if you see a trend. From my experience, there really isn’t one. Early stage VC is not like later stage private equity where most people have been investment bankers in the past. Early stage VC backgrounds range widely – entrepreneurs, big tech company experience, consultants, finance and a wide range of functions – engineers, sales, BD, etc. The other point I like to make is that arguably the best VC in the world was a journalist. But the one consistent thing is whatever the background, most did whatever they did really well. So, don’t worry about trying to pick the best “VC prep” field. Pick based on what you LOVE to do and will EXCEL at – this is the best way to get to where you want to go, whether it be VC  or not.
• Every VC will have a different perspective on types of backgrounds that they prefer – and it will vary based on individual partner’s preferences and needs at the time. Because of the diversity of backgrounds, you’ll get the same diversity in what they each view as important. Personally, I look for startup experience and some kind of general business experience (it could be from a startup if you were in a business role or consulting or large company experience).
• Because the VC industry is so small and hiring can be somewhat opportunistic in many instances, luck and timing play a HUGE role. So, how do you prepare to have better luck and timing? Work your ass off, “you create your own luck.” To do this, you need to be in the right places at the right times. The only way to do this is work it. Network like crazy. Get to know VCs and entrepreneurs. Be known….and hopefully, when a position opens up, you may be top of mind because of the luck you created.
• Do what you can to get experience early – and not necessarily in a formal role. Internships are a great way to get exposure and experience. Work with very startups in a consulting capacity as a way to get exposure to the fund raising process.
• Read and track the newest trends. I (like most early stage tech VC’s) track a number of site regularly in my area of focus. For me, its sites like TechCrunch, VentureBeat, Socaltech, PaidContent, PEHub, etc. Also, a long list of blogs through RSS feeds to Google Reader. Why do this? Well, hopefully you do it because you are already interested in this stuff because you love it. Practically, the way you’ll often break the ice with a VC is by showing you know their industry very well and can show real insight into spaces they are looking.

Again, there are plenty of other important things to consider aside from just the specifics of how to break in. How to prepare your background to be a successful VC. How to know whether you will actually like the work on a day-to-day basis. How to add real value once you are a VC. How to rise to partner once you break in (assuming you don’t enter as a partner).

Ultimately, there is no silver bullet that will be your answer to what you can do to get a job in VC. Its highly individual. It varies widely. It takes a lot of timing and luck….and, if you’ve made it down this far in this blog post and you still want in, its a good sign – perseverance and optimism in the face of tough odds could be your edge.

To differentiate the roles, I’ll actually split them into two groups, not based on title, but on their “authority”. From my experience, it really comes down to check-writers and non-check-writers, Hopefully this distinction is fairly self explanatory but really comes down to  do they have the authority to decide (obviously with the general agreement of the other partners in the fund) on whether they will fund a startup or not and serve on the board. Rarely do even check-writers decide completely on their own – that’s why they call it a partnership since there is a level of trust, influence, and sharing of responsibility.

Titles, just like in companies, often mean very different things in venture capital firms. With titles ranging from Analyst, Associate, Senior Associate, Vice-President, Principal, Senior Principal, Operating Partner, Associate Partner, Venture Partner, Principal Partner, Partner, General Partner, Managing Partner, Managing Director, etc – it can get confusing very very quickly. Basically, its really hard to tell who is a check-writer vs not. VERY GENERALLY, if forced to bucket them, the breakdown is (not 100% across firms but maybe 90% accurate)

• Check-writers – Managing Director, Managing Partner, General Partner, Partner
• Non-check-writers – Analyst, Associate, Senior Associate,  Operating Partner, Associate Partner
• Can go either way – Vice-President, Principal, Venture Partner, Principal Partner

The unfortunate thing (or fortunate depending on your perspective), even VCs (not just entrepreneurs) themselves often can’t tell the different when it comes to another firm unless they are very familiar with that particular firms structure and the individual’s involved. It gets even more complicated because many non-check-writers at firms want to project to the outside world that they can write-checks (trying to boost their credibility and influence in a firm to the entrepreneur) even though they can’t.

Essentially, if you want funding, you need to get to a check-writer (pretty obvious at this point). They will be the one who champion’s your deal in their partnership and can push to get it funded – putting their own reputation on the line with their decision.

The area that is less clear is the role of the non-check-writer. Simple advice – they are valuable and can be your greatest ally or your worst barrier to getting funding, but they are often a necessary and intermediate step to get to the check-writer.

To get into more detail, the non-check-writer (typically an associate) is often the “first line of defense” for a VC firm. They are responsible for screening deals so they at least pass the initial sniff test. Unless you get a trusted referral directly to a partner in a firm, the associate is generally the one who will do the first pass and often take the initial pitch. Often due to bandwidth limitations (or laziness), the partner will just pass deals they receive directly onto their associate anyway. This initial review by the associate is important as they are the gatekeepers to get access to the check-writers. Impress them and they will convince the partner to take a meeting as they often will have the ear of the partner.

In addition to being the gatekeeper, pitching the associate can be extremely valuable to get feedback on how the partnership thinks about investments as they will have a good sense of what excites the partners in the firm. Use this time well to hone your pitch, get feedback, and prepare yourself for the next one. Often, the associate will also have a good read on the personalities and preferences of the partners that can be immensely valuable as well as fund status.

The things you want to watch out for is continuing to meet with the associate over and over again without any sense of moving forward to that partner meeting. This can be a slow and painful death….but, don’t necessarily expect that you should get to that partner meeting after just 1 meeting with the associate. Often, if your pitch isn’t quite ready or there just wasn’t enough information to “let you through the gate” they will ask you for some additional information and another meeting to make sure. This can be a worthwhile exercise as you typically will only get 1 shot with the partner and if you screw up, its over. You’ll just need to read the associate well and/or ask them directly about what additional information they need before a partner meeting might be expected. Be straightforward but realistic about the questions and diligence items that are being requested but generally, if you aren’t getting invited in at least after a 2nd meeting with an associate, better to just cut bait and fish somewhere else – its likely a dead end.

Ultimately, an associate is balancing trying to find a company to “get a deal done” and making sure his filter is tight so he doesn’t waste the partners time. Understand the associate’s motivations, listen carefully to their feedback, and treat them professionally and you’ll maximize your chances of getting through. Treat them poorly and ignore their feedback and you’ve likely just shot yourself in the foot. Remember, VC’s judge teams (not just experience and qualifications but personality) as much or more than the business itself. Leave a bad personal impression with the associate and it will absolutely get passed onto the partner.

Going through fund-raising can be a long and confusing process – even in the smoothest of deals. The associate can be a huge ally to guide you through this so work with them and take advantage – you’ll be better off….but keep your eye on the goal – get to a meeting with the check-writer and convince them as they are the decision makers in the end.

I think for entrepreneurs who haven’t been been through fund raises already, the first and obvious reaction is the get the highest valuation possible and if you do, you’ll have “won the battle”. I guess it makes sense that this viewpoint is commonly held – in many other areas of negotiations, auctions, grades, sales deals, etc, the goal is to get to the extreme (either lowest or highest) and the closer you get, the better you did. Its how they got to where they are now – by winning and excelling in everything they did. They view the “valuation negotiation” with a VC just another competition to win.

So, why isn’t this the right approach for entrepreneurs? (and the answer is not because I’m the VC writing this and I’m trying to convince you to take a lower valuation – but good try!). The reason is because a) the funding is a financing event, not an exit (the exit is when its decided whether you win or lose) and b) the prior valuation has a significant impact if and when another financing round is required. The exception to this is if this is definitely the last financing round the company will need before exiting – and even this has it pitfalls when it comes time to exit (see my earlier post about entrepreneur and investor alignment specifically regarding exits and the VCs need for high returns and a multiple on their investment).

For the entrepreneur, the financing event and resulting valuation merely puts a number on the company value which then affects the percentage ownership the founder has in the company – but this doesn’t translate to real money that the owners can walk away with (I’m sure those of you who were at startups during the dot.com bubble but didn’t exit before the crash can relate to this quite well…). Its paper wealth. Funny-money. Remember 100% ownership of nothin’ is still nothin’…

Valuation becomes a real issue for those companies that need to raise another round of financing (this may be where many of the entrepreneurs who raised money in the last 18 months before the market crash last fall start to perk up…). A high valuation (which 12 months ago seemed like a huge success) is now feeling like a huge albatross – a heavy burden on the company that may stifle their ability to raise money from an outside investor. This occurs because the prior round investors want to be rewarded for putting money in earlier through getting a higher “step-up” valuation in the next round. The new investor is often wary of companies with valuations too high as their expectations for a smooth round getting done is put at risk as they worry about spending a lot of effort for a down round that gets resistance or just gets done by the insiders (prior investors). In a startup, momentum is very important on how the world perceives your succes. When things continue to be on the “up-and-up” across all areas of the business – great team is built out, revenues increase, customer base grows, metrics improve….and valuation continue to rise round-after-round, everyone is happy.

Now, just to be fair, on the other side of the table, it isn’t in the best interest of the VC to drive to the lowest valuation possible either. This is because if the founder/entrepreneur doesn’t have enough of an ownership stake in the company (especially after several financing rounds), there is a real risk that the founder may leave if he feels like the reward for staying isn’t big enough vs doing something else (starting another company, taking the big corner office at a cushy large company job, etc) – remember, being an entrepreneur is hard work and people need to be rewarded for their commitment.

Somewhere in the middle between a valuation so high it risks future financings and a valuation so low it dis-incentivizes (I know this isn’t a word but it should be….) the founders is the optimal valuation. For the entrepreneur and VC, the goal should be to find a fair valuation for everyone. The entrepreneur/VC relationship is a long-term one, often 5+ years. Raise these concerns with the VC and get it on the table so both of you see each other’s perspectives and motivations. Its a good initial step in a very long journey that will ultimate be in both of your best interests. Remember, “winning the war” is the goal – exiting the company so that both you and your investor makes money through an exit. The fund raises and valuations are just a step along the way towards the final goal.

As this topic can be a bit confusing, feel free to sign up for my office hours to discuss at greater length.

[Update: 6/19/2009 Thanks to Ben Kuo at SoCalTech for the posting. ]

For inexperienced entrepreneurs, this issue is not well understood and often leads to some of the biggest areas of disagreement and tension between the entrepreneur and investor. While there are numerous areas where this can occur, I’m going to focus on one where I find the most tension and misunderstanding of the issues. Exit options, VC fund sizes, VC/entrepreneur alignment, and founders’ outcome (in a future post, I will address some of the other issues such as CEO/Founder replacement, VC fund raising cycles and LP ).

Before diving into this discussion, for those of you that are less familiar with VC fund economics, some background reading may be helpful. The first is more of a VC industry analysis by Fred Wilson of Union Square Ventures and the second dives more specifically into the economics of an example fund by Josh Kopelman of First Round Capital. These issues are well understood by VC’s as that is their industry and reflects directly on their own personal economics as it relates to carried interest in their fund (i.e., think about a sales persons understanding of their own compensation/commission structure and how it affects their own motivations and economics).

So, how do the different fund sizes affect VC and founder alignment? Lets first look at it from the VC side and take 2 examples – a large fund of $400-500M and a smaller fund of $50-100M. If you read the background material and/or already understood VC economics/dynamic, there is a difference between how partners at each of those funds will look at exit sizes that are considered worthwhile/successful/attractive. Much of this really boils down to the amount of time each partner has to sit on boards and work with their companies if they consider themselves active investors. With the number of boards that can reasonably be held by one partner in the 6-8 range, this limits the number of investments he can make, which then dictates the average amount of money he typically needs to put into a particular investment, and ultimately drives the need for the size of exit he needs to make the economics work for the fund and himself. In the 2 example fund sizes, obviously larger funds typically need to put in more money (often $10-15M per company) and thereby requiring large exits (in the multiple hundreds of millions per company minimum) vs a smaller fund (often $2-5M per company and with exits in the sub-$100M range reasonable from a fund and personal return perspective). The constant here is that both investors have the same amount of time and bandwidth and will typically do the same number of investments per fund. For an entrepreneur, it is fairly straightforward to see the differences between the 2 types of funds just based on fund size and number of investing partners.

Now lets take a look at it from the founder/entrepreneur’s perspective where there is also a wide range of “personal economics” that matter. To simplify, I’ll just use 2 examples – an entrepreneur who is looking for a large personal exit (one that will make him $25-50M ) and an entrepreneur who is looking for a moderate personal exit (one that will make him $5-10M). Often this is largely based on their personal economic situation at the time (i.e., an already successful entrepreneur who has had his first good exit and put away $5-10M in the bank vs the entrepreneur who maybe has seen modest success with less than $1-2M put away).

Given these two perspectives (VC vs entrepreneur) and the different fund sizes and entrepreneur exit size preferences, this is where investor and entrepreneur alignment becomes critically important in “Seeing Eye To Eye.” Putting my consulting hat on and analyzing this using a 2×2 matrix…

In the matrix, the green represents good alignment, the yellow represents ok but keep watch, and the red represents where I see some of the larger disagreements. The matrix explains the basic situation for all 4 combinations so I’ll just focus on the yellow and red areas as the green areas are fairly self-explanatory and straightforward.

Yellow – Smaller VC fund, Smaller exit need, Entrepreneur looking for large personal win $25-50M. While there is some misalignment here, this is actually a less common situation and often doesn’t become an issue in practice. The reasons are that many entrepreneurs looking for big exits often have already had one hit and have plenty of personal funds. They often use their own money to self-fund the business initially and often don’t need a small amount of outside money but go straight for a much larger Series A from a larger VC. In addition, even for smaller funds who do invest early with these entrepreneurs, if the company is doing very well, those investors are happy to bring in larger VC syndicate partners who have deeper pockets and can fund to a much larger exit. The smaller VC will get a good bump in valuation and is happy to leverage their investment to go for the big exit that the entrepreneur and new VC seek.

Red – Larger VC fund, Larger exit need, Entrepreneur looking for moderate personal win $5-10M. This is where I see the most misalignment, conflicts between VC and entrepreneur, and the primary focus of this post. The conflict occurs in many different situations – whether a company is doing well or not. When companies are doing well, they often have opportunities to exit earlier from incoming acquisition offers. For an entrepreneur who has an opportunity to exit a company at $50M and thereby allowing the entrepreneur to personally make more than $5-10M, this often isn’t big enough to interest the VC who can block the exit and push the company to go for higher exit size (but often a much higher risk to the company). Other areas that this occurs is when determining whether to grow/expand quickly vs getting to profitability. For an entrepreneur to reach his objective, slower growth but getting to profitabilty faster can be the best option, but for the VC, growth over profitability is often the objective thereby require more spend and often leading to more financing rounds diluting the entrepreneur….and these disagreements occur when the company is doing well so generally everyone is happier and want to work together. The misalignment get much more contentious when the company is not doing as well.

Given the varied perspectives of different VCs and entrepreneurs, founders should make sure they understand this dynamic (as the VC will definitely be experienced and understand this well). Ultimately the VC/entrepreneur relationship is a long-term partnership (you may be stuck together for 5+ years). Make sure you go into the relationship understanding each others motivations and goals – it will make for a much more productive and less contentious relationship.

The commonly heard 30 sec or 1 min elevator pitch is ok when an entrepreneur is pitching a customer or for PR or other audience that isn’t looking at the business holistically but is only interested in 1 or 2 aspects of the business. For a VC though, it is just not enough time to cover the information to get me interested. In the 30 sec or 1 min pitch, there is barely enough time to cover the market and product let alone competitive differentiation, business model, industry trends, financing plans. and key metrics such as customer acquisition and average revenue per user. The entrepreneurs’ ability to convey the business concisely in a compelling manner is a huge indicator of their understanding of the business as well as how they will think and act when running the business. What surprises me is how many entrepreneurs are so bad at this.

In a startup, one of my favorite sayings is “you can do anything, but you can’t do everything.” With limited time and resources, entrepreneurs must cut through the clutter and focus their time and attention on the most critical issues. A founder or CEO who can’t explain the key aspects of his business concisely and rambles on about un-important details worry me that he will behave similarly when running the business.

The 5 min overview should be a mini version of the entire pitch but forces the entrepreneur to really hone in on the most critical aspects of the business that will influence its success or failure. Like Mark Twain’s famous quote, “I would have written a shorter letter, but I did not have the time,” the ability to quickly and concisely explain the business indicates to me that the entrepreneur has really thought about and understands his business.

The reason I ask for the 5 min pitch before the entrepreneurs’ bio is that I actually like to judge the attractiveness of the business independent of the team. When I hear the bios of the founders first, it obviously sways me (which it should) as I hear the rest of the business. While the fit/capability of the team is paramount to my decision, I find it is better left until after I understand the basic premise of the business so that I can really assess the business purely on its own merits. After this, hearing the entrepreneurs’ backgrounds allow me to then assess their ability (and hopefully their clear advantage) in executing on the business.

In VC, when I am assessing the “fundability” of a company, I find that out of the many many factors that can influence the business, it generally boils down to 2 or 3 critical issues that make the decision. If these 2 or 3 issues are negative and all of the other issues are positive, it still kills the deal for me. The best 5 min elevator pitch is the one that has done this work for me.

Now…once you have me hooked on the business and then the team, we can have a productive meeting getting into the presentation deck and questions about the details of business.

Thanks to Ben Kuo for taking the time to chat. He’s done a great job reporting on Southern California and helping to build the community here.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/25/technology/start-ups/25startup.html

With the market tanking, the pendulum for consumer internet space monetization, which has largely relied on advertising as their primary business model, is quickly swinging the other way – to direct user charging methods such as subscriptions or virtual goods. I think this is a good, necessary, and inevitable outcome. While I wholeheardly still believe broadly in the internet advertising model, I think too much emphasis had been placed on this single form of monetization at the expense of billions of dollars of venture capital, private equity, and public offerings which funded money losing businesses for years.

The biggest problem I foresee though is that many consumers’ expectation have now been set – that people believe that internet services should be free. The last decade of internet companies has established this precedence and this will not go away easily or quickly. I personally think of one of the most widely used and under-monetized applications on the web – free online email accounts. This is a prime example of a product that created tremendous value but was not able to capture value.

The issue becomes pronounced for entrepreneurs when many newly established companies emerge without the benefit of huge and multiple venture capital rounds willing to keep funding money losing businesses. So, what should entrepreneurs do when they are faced with the situation of a) needing to generate revenue quickly because there is less funding available but b) having to compete with so many free services that already exist which may eventually die away but are still plugging along in a desperate race to the bottom.

While I don’t promise to have the answer, here is how I’ve been thinking about the problem and what kinds of business I’ve been looking at recently.

1. Look at markets whose customers have been used to paying in the past such as marketing services, gaming, enterprise, SMB, etc. – generally originating from non-internet based roots.
2. Think about niche audiences from a monetization perspective but build the platform for wider application to make investors believe in the ultimate size of the opportunity.
3. Timing is everything – be thoughful not only about why your business is right but why NOW is the right time for it.
4. Focus on product. Great products overcome the odds.
5. Live and breathe metrics. The two most important for many of the businesses I look at are the balance of a) customer acquisition cost and b) lifetime value of the customer. Make sure your funding aligns with this ramp.

While most business I see now have multiple revenue streams, many are knee-jerk reactions to the market and haven’t really been thought through to see if they are realistic and viable. Do your homework and don’t force fit a model that doesn’t work. But opportunity is ripe and I do believe the next couple of years will be a wonderful time of innovation around business models.

This is especially suited for anyone who is thinking about starting a business or trying to decide how to think about fund raising. My intention is to provide a safe way to ask the “dumb” questions. For many new entrepreneurs, its hard enough to get facetime with a VC (especially in Southern California where there are just fewer firms), let alone being comfortable asking general questions about the process and to see if you are at least thinking about the right things.

Go to my shared Google Calendar (switch to Week view – not sure how to make this view default – if anyone knows, send me an email) and look for any time slots labeled “OPEN”. Send an email to officehours [at] barodaventures [dot] com and let me know a 30min time slot that fits in one of the OPEN slots and send me a phone number where I can reach you and a quick overview of what you’d like to discuss.

I will continually be updating new time slots on an ongoing basis so keep checking back and let others know. I hope this format will be useful and helpful for any entrepreneurs looking for a safe forum to get advice.

NOTE 1 : After your session, please go back to the Baroda Ventures homepage and click on Entrepreneur Feedback Form and leave me some comments on how I can do my job better

NOTE 2 : This should be used for entrepreneurs looking for advice (i.e., not for people looking to get a job in VC or general career advice)

• Google Apps hosted email, calendar, and contacts for Baroda Ventures
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The biggest area that I still don’t fully use the cloud is my dependence on Microsoft Office. While I like Google Docs for some things, its not quite there for me to fully move over but with Dropbox, I’ve been able to keep much of the cloud access functionality.